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CONTROL DISTRIBUTION DEVICES
BY F. HODGE O'NEAL*
I. INTRODUCTION
THIS ARTICLE will discuss the various devices which may be utilized in
allocating control and management powers in a close corporation. Spe-
cifically, it will analyze the following devices and techniques: (1) classi-
fication of stock and allocation of shares of the various classes among the
shareholders; (2) class voting for directors; (3) charter or by-law provisions
requiring unanimity or high percentage votes for shareholder or director
action; (4) miscellaneous special charter or by-law clauses affecting manage-
ment; (5) voting agreements and other agreements among shareholders; (6)
voting trusts; (7) irrevocable proxies; (8) holding companies; and (9)
management contracts. The objective of this article is to provide an overall
view of these control devices and to provide "idea guides" for the lawyer
planning the control pattern of a close corporation.'
II. CLASSIFICATION OF STOCK
A useful technique in distributing control is to create two or more
classes of shares and carefully allocate shares of the various classes among
the participants in the close corporation. Provision can be made in the
charter for several classes of shares with different voting power, rights to
dividends, rights on liquidation and other qualities. Some classes of shares
can be common shares, others preferred. Shares in some classes can be
given a par value; shares in other classes can be without par value. Shares
in some classes can be made callable at the option of the corporation, while
shares in other classes can be convertible into other securities at the option
of the holders. A class of shares can be made nonvoting, or voting rights
can be made to vary according to the question under consideration. For
example, a class of shares may be deprived of the right to vote only in the
election of directors or on by-laws or on fundamental corporate action;
or it may be deprived of the right to vote altogether (subject to mandatory
statutes in some jurisdictions granting certain voting rights to all share-
holders). Furthermore, it can be provided that votes on some types of action
be by shares and on other kinds of action by classes. By varying the voting
powers, dividend rights, and other qualities of the several classes of stock,
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and by using different combinations in allocating shares of the various
classes, almost any desired control arrangement can be achieved.
In Illinois,2 and perhaps a few other states, nonvoting shares cannot
be created. In such jurisdictions the desired control arrangement usually
can be attained by using several classes of stock. Each share, regardless
of its class, must be given a vote; but the number of shares in a class can
vary, and the financial interests (the claim on dividends and the assets on
dissolution) represented by the shares can differ from class to class. Thus,
$1 par value common stock can be issued to some of the participants and
$100 par value preferred stock to others. If all the shares are issued at par
value, the recipients of the $1 par stock will get a favorable 100 to I ratio of
control to investment. Dividend and liquidation rights of the two classes
can be adjusted to fit the business bargain of the participants. Likewise,
no-par stock or a combination of par value and no-par stock can also be used
to obtain a desired allocation of control. To achieve the desired pattern
of control, several classes of shares are issued at different prices and a large
number of shares are placed in the hands of the participants who are to
have control. In formulating the stock structure and control plan, the
lawyer must of course remember that par value shares normally cannot
legally be issued for less than their par value.
III. CLASS VOTING FOR DIRECTORS
One of the best techniques for assuring that all or several of the par-
ticipants in a close corporation will be represented on the board of directors
is to create two or more classes of shares and provide that each class shall
elect a specified number or a stated percentage of the directors.3 Thus,
class A common stock might be given the power to elect three directors
and class B common stock the power to elect two.4
If all of the shares in a class are issued to one individual, he will be
able to transfer 49 per cent of his shares and still retain the power to elect
all the directors represented by that class of shares. This type of arrangement
facilitates estate planning since the recipient of a class of shares can give
shares to his children or to others without any loss of control as long as
he retains more than half the shares in the class.
Where there are two groups of shareholders, each wanting a veto
power over director action, a board with an even number of directors
can be created and each group given a class of stock with power to elect
2 ILL. CONST. art. XI, S 3; ILu.. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.28 (1968). See People ex rel.
Watseka Tel. Co. v. Emmerson, 302 Ill. 300, 134 N.E. 707 (1922).
a Illinois prohibits class voting. See Wolfson v. Avery, 6 Ill. 2d 78, 126 N.E2d 701
(1955).
4 For a corporation charter providing for class voting for directors, see Investment
Associates v. Standard Power & Light Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 225, 48 A.2d 501 (Ch. 1946),
aff'd, 29 Del. Ch. 593, 51 A.2d 572 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
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half of the board. This arrangement, of course, might lead to a deadlock.
Despite its usefulness as a control device, class voting for directors
is objected to on the grounds that it often makes an increase in the number
of directors difficult to obtain. This is particularly crucial when the cor-
poration is growing and needs a larger board.
In focusing on class voting for directors, the lawyer must be aware
of the manner in which the voting power is going to be distributed on other
matters. Corporation statutes generally require the consent of the holders of
two-thirds or three-fourths of the voting shares for charter amendments,
mergers, sale of substantially all corporate assets not in the usual course of
business, and other fundamental changes. Thus, the lawyer must note where
the two-thirds or three-fourths voting power will lie and whether one
shareholder or group of shareholders will have the power to veto corporate
action requiring a larger-than-majority vote of the shareholders.
The lawyer must also protect against disruption of a control arrange-
ment of this kind by an amendment to the charter abolishing classified
voting, increasing the size of the board of directors, or authorizing the
issuance of additional shares within a class. In most states, this problem
can be solved by requiring a class vote or a high overall shareholder vote
to amend the charter.
IV. CHARTER OR BY-LAw CLAUSES REQUIRING HIGH VOTES
Businessmen acquiring minority interests in close corporations often
seek protection against the broad powers vested in shareholders and directors
to determine corporate policies and to make decisions by simple majority
vote.5 In effect, they want the power to veto some or all corporate decisions.
One of the most effective ways to provide this veto is by charter or by-law
provisions requiring unanimity or concurrence of a high percentage of
voting units for shareholder or director action.6
5 For a discussion of techniques of oppression and of squeeze-out devices available
to majority shareholders in a close corporation where a minority shareholder does not
insist on a veto power or other protective arrangements when he comes into the enter-
prise, see F. O'NEA. & J. DERWIN, EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATES:
"SQUEEZE-OUTS" IN SMALL ENTERPRISES §§ 3.01-5.05 (1961).
6 Illinois law authorizes by-laws or provisions in the articles of incorporation
which require a high vote, i.e., greater than majority, to constitute action of the board
of directors:
"A majority of the number of directors ... shall constitute a quorum ...
unless a greater number is required by the articles of incorporation or the by-laws.
The act of the majority of the directors present at a meeting at which a quorum
is present shall be the act of the board of directors, unless the act of a greater
number is required by the articles of incorporation or the by-laws."
Ill. Bus. Corp. Act § 37, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.37 (1967). Section 31 of the Illinois
Act authorizes high vote requirements for shareholder action. See Moss v. Waytz, 4 111.
2d 296, 124 N.E.2d 91 (1st Dist. 1955), where a preincorporation contract requiring a
unanimous vote was held binding and was not effected by a subsequent by-law providing
for only a majority vote. Also upholding an unanimous vote requirement was Fitzgerald
v. Christy, 242 Ill. App. 343 (lst Dist. 1926).
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In most jurisdictions, a veto over fundamental changes in the cor-
porate structure can easily be accomplished. Modem corporation statutes
provide for shareholder participation in fundamental corporate acts such
as charter amendment, merger, consolidation, dissolution, and sale of assets
other than in the usual course of business. If properly protected against
amendment, a charter provision requiring unanimity for shareholder action
on these matters will give each shareholder an effective veto over funda-
mental corporate changes. Similarly, a provision requiring approval by the
holders of a high percentage of the shares for shareholder action can be used
to provide a veto over fundamental acts. For instance, a requirement of
approval by the holders of 75 per cent of the shares obviously empowers
a person holding 30 per cent of the shares to prevent shareholder action,
provided the requirement is protected against circumvention through the
issuance of additional stock.
High voting requirements for shareholder action usually do not en-
compass the power to veto such important policy matters as changes in
officers' salaries, or the day-to-day conduct of business. To provide a veto
over those matters, unanimity or a high vote must be required for director
action,7 and the shareholders for whom a veto is sought must be assured
representation on the board of directors. Furthermore, it may be necessary
to define narrowly the authority and duties of corporate officers in the
charter or by-laws; otherwise, corporate officers may have the authority
to perform acts against which a veto is desired without obtaining director
approval.
Whenever a shareholder has sufficient voting strength to maintain
representation on the board, a requirement of unanimity for board action
enables him to veto any action within the province of the board. Repre-
sentation on the board can usually be assured a minority shareholder by
employing cumulative voting or by classifying the shares and providing
for election of some directors by one class of shares and other directors
by a second class of shares." To guard against possible board action while
the shareholder's position on the board is vacant because of the death or
resignation of his representative, a provision can be placed in the charter
or by-laws prohibiting board action until the vacancy has been filled.9
Whenever a shareholder cannot be assured representation on the board
"[T]he fact that the statutes provide that a majority of the directors elected
shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business does not prevent the
directors, who include all the stockholders, [from] agreeing that a unanimous vote
shall be required on certain questions."
Id. at 359.
7 For an example of by-laws requiring unanimity for director action and a high
vote for shareholder action, see Roland Park Shopping Center, Inc. v. Hendler, 206 Md.
10, 109 A.2d 753 (Ct. App. 1954).
8 See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
9 See Strong v. Fromm Laboratories, Inc., 273 Wis. 159, 77 N.W.2d 389 (1956)
(by-law barred directors from transacting business while vacancy unfilled).
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or whenever an effective veto of board action cannot be given, a veto over
matters ordinarily within the province of the board can sometimes be
achieved by transferring decision-making power over those matters from
the directors to the shareholders and then requiring unanimity or a high
vote for shareholder action. In most states the blanket transfer of all cor-
porate power to the shareholder, completely divesting the board of its
customary functions, probably would not be sustained. First, the great
majority of corporation statutes contain sections which vest the management
of the corporation and the control of ordinary corporate affairs in the
board of directors. Second, some statutes contain provisions which empower
the board to perform specified acts, such as the selection of corporate
officers. In some jurisdictions, the control vested in the directors by these
statutes apparently cannot be transferred to the shareholders or limited by
a requirement that the shareholders must ratify action taken by the directors
for it to become effective.10
Many corporation statutes, however, permit the charter or by-laws to
determine whether certain corporate acts are to be performed by the share-
holders or by the directors. The Pennsylvania statute, for example, states
that "unless the article or by-laws provide otherwise, the board of directors
shall elect and fix the compensation" of officers and assistant officers."
Thus, if the shareholders desire a veto over the selection of corporate officers
and the fixing of their salaries, a clause can be inserted in the charter provid-
ing that the shareholders shall elect the officers and fix their salaries and
that this action can be taken only by a unanimous vote or by a specified vote
greater than a majority. Similarly, under the laws of a number of states,
the charter may require shareholder consent for the execution of corporate
mortgages.'2
Some lawyers, with a view to conferring a veto, insert provisions in
the charter or by-laws requiring the presence of a high percentage of share-
holders or directors to constitute a quorum for the transaction of any busi-
ness or of designated kinds of business. To protect shareholders or directors
against their inadvertently appearing at a meeting in which action they
oppose is to be considered, the high quorum requirement must be buttressed
by a requirement that notices of meetings state the business that is to be
transacted. Otherwise, a shareholder or director might attend a meeting,
help form a quorum, and thereby permit action on a matter he opposes.13
10 See Security Say. & Trust Co. v. Coos Bay Lumber & Coal Co., 219 Wis. 647,
263 N.W. 187 (1935) (declaring invalid a by-law requiring shareholder consent for
specified acts within the province of the directors).
1 1 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, S 1406 (1967).
12E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 3900 (West 1955); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-509 (1964).
See Note, Provisions for Stockholders' Consent in the Execution of Corporate Mortgages,
51 HARv. L. REV. 1074 (1938).
13 The New York Court of Appeals has greatly diminished, if not completely
eliminated, the protection afforded minority interests by high quorum requirements
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Many lawyers apparently believe that the use of both high-quorum and
high-vote requirements establishes a double hurdle which objectionable
action must clear before it will become effective. Actually, this double
obstacle is an illusion. If a shareholder or director does not attend a meeting
in order to prevent the forming of a quorum, he never gets an opportunity
to veto a proposal by voting against it. Conversely, if he appears and casts
his vote against a proposal, the quorum obstacle disappears. In most situa-
tions, it is preferable to rely solely on a high vote requirement. This permits
shareholders or directors in apparent disagreement to come together, discuss
their differences, and possibly discover areas of agreement or devise policies
satisfactory to all.
Although high vote provisions are very useful in fashioning manage-
ment patterns for closely held corporations, the limitations and disadvantages
of such provisions must not be overlooked. They give a veto and no more;
they do not enable minority shareholders to determine policy affimatively
and to go forward with the execution of that policy. Secondly, they deprive
the corporation of the flexibility it may need to adjust to unexpected busi-
ness situations. At the time of incorporation, the lawyer cannot foresee
changes in policy and methods of operation which may become advan-
tageous in the future. Finally, high vote requirements may place one or
two shareholders in a position to extort unfair concessions from the other
shareholders as a condition to approving beneficial corporate action. The
use of such provisions, therefore, involves a problem of weighing the safe-
guards necessary to protect the interests of minority shareholders against
the freedom of action that is beneficial to the corporation and the share-
holders as a group.
V. SPECIAL CHARTER OR BY-LAw CLAusEs AFFECTING CONTROL
Special charter or by-law clauses are often very useful in tailoring the
control pattern of a corporation. Among the clauses which may be employed
are those which: (1) give shareholders the power to remove directors at
any time without cause; (2) abolish the board of directors or sharply restrict
the board's powers (in jurisdictions where this is permissible); (3) strengthen
the shareholders' rights to inspect books and records; (4) strengthen, define,
or abolish pre-emptive rights; (5) provide for arbitration or other pro-
cedures for settling disputes or resolving deadlocks; (6) authorize directors
for directors' meetings and has created a dangerous trap for the unwary by its decision
in Gearing v. Kelly, 11 N.Y.2d 201, 182 N.E.2d 391, 227 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1962), noted
in 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1518 (1962) and Kessler, 1962 Survey of New York Law: Business
Associations, 14 SYRACUSE L. REV. 235 (1962)* The court held that a director who pre-
vented the presence of a quorum by refusing to attend a special board meeting called
to fill a vacancy on the board, which would have given a majority to the opposing
faction, could not later come into court and challenge the election of a director as being
irregular since he himself caused the irregularity by deliberately refusing to attend the
meeting.
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to fix their own compensation; (7) require an increase in dividends when
compensation of executives is increased.
The clauses enumerated are not exhaustive. Other special charter or
by-law clauses undoubtedly will occur to resourceful and energetic drafts-
men grappling with particular business situations.
VI. VOTING AGREEMENTS AND OTHER SHAREHOLDER CONTRACTs
Perhaps the most frequently used control device in close corporations
is a shareholders' voting agreement or some other shareholder contract
allocating control and management powers among the participants. All
shareholders, a majority of the shareholders, or even the holders of a minority
of the shares may enter into such an agreement.
A typical shareholders' control agreement covers some or all of the
following matters: (1) who are to be the directors or how the participants'
shares are to be voted in the election of directors; (2) who are to serve
as the corporation's officers and key employees and what is to be their
compensation; and (3) what voice the various participants are to have
in management and policy decisions. An agreement may also contain pro-
visions on how corporate earnings are to be distributed, how disputes among
participants are to be resolved, and what procedure is to be followed in
dissolving the corporation.1 4
In addition shareholders' agreements frequently contain provisions which
do not deal directly with management or control, but which prevent transfers
of stock that might upset carefully formulated control agreements. Among
these nonmanagement provisions are restrictions on the alienability of shares
and provisions for the purchase of the interest of a deceased shareholder.
The lawyer needs to remember that shareholders' control agreements
are frequently challenged as being invalid, especially those that purport
to regulate matters which are normally within the province of the board
of directors. Special precautions should be taken to protect such agreements
against attack or circumvention. 15
14 In Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1965), the Illinois Supreme
Court upheld a stockholder voting agreement which provided that: (1) the board of
directors was to be composed of four directors, three of whom would constitute a
quorum; (2) ten days advance notice to all directors was required for any directors
meeting; (3) the participants in the agreement were required to elect four named
persons to directorships (the two majority shareholders and their wives); (4) in the
event of either majority shareholder's death, his wife could nominate a director to take
his place; (5) annual dividends of $50,000 were to be declared out of earned surplus in
excess of $500,000; (6) salary continuation agreements were provided in the event of
the death of one of the majority shareholders (twice his annual salary to his wife
over a five-year period); and (7) heirs of a deceased shareholder were guaranteed the
same voting representation and dividend payment, even if the corporation elected to
exercise its authority under the agreement to purchase some of their shares to enable
the heirs to pay the inheritance and estate taxes of the deceased shareholder's estate.
15See O'Neal, Protecting Sharebolders' Control Agreements Against Attack, 14
Bus. LAw. 184 (1959).
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VII. VOTING TRUSTS
The voting trust is not just a "big business" instrument as is sometimes
supposed. It is a flexible device which can be very useful in working out
the control arrangement in a close corporation.
Shareholders may create a voting trust by entering into trust agree-
ments or by transferring title to their shares to voting trustees who in return
issue certificates of beneficial interest, usually called "voting trust certifi-
cates," to the shareholders. The trustees then vote the shares in accordance
with the terms of the trust agreement.
Apart from limitations imposed by statute or public policy, the parties
to a voting trust agreement may adopt whatever provisions, as to both
substance and procedure, that they desire. For example, a trust agreement
can name the persons for whom the trustees are to vote in the election of
directors, or it can establish a board of trustees with an equal number of
members and provide for an arbitrator to cast the deciding vote in the
event of an equal division among the trustees. Even in the absence of statute,
the prevailing view is that a voting trust is valid if it has a proper purpose.
Although the intended duration of a voting trust is a factor which courts
consider in passing on its validity, voting trusts have been sustained which
were to last 2 5 years or longer.
Most states now have statutes which expressly authorize the creation
of voting trusts, thus removing doubt as to their validity when the statutory
terms are met and the purposes of the trusts are proper. The voting trust
statutes usually place a maximum on the duration of such trusts, typically
10 years,16 and often contain some type of registration requirement.
Holders of a majority of the voting shares in a close corporation some-
times use a voting trust instead of a voting agreement as a device for con-
solidating their voting power and assuring that their shares will be voted
as a unit. In a particular jurisdiction a voting trust may be chosen instead
of a shareholders' agreement because a statute expressly recognizes the
legality of voting trusts and sets forth the procedure for their creation, while
satisfactory statutory or judicial support for shareholders' agreements can-
not be found. Furthermore, a voting trust may be selected because it is
self-executing, while specific performance of a shareholders' agreement might
not be available and, in any event, would involve risks and delays.
Nevertheless, in most jurisdictions a shareholders' agreement is usually
preferable to a voting trust for allocating control in a close corporation.
As has been pointed out, voting trust statutes set a maximum limit on the
duration of voting trusts, usually 10 years. A particular business situation
may well require a control arrangement of longer duration. Other limita-
tions or conditions established by some of the voting trust statutes may
16 See Ill. Bus. CoRP. Acr S 30a, Ill. REv. STAT. ch. 32, S 157.30a (1967), limiting
the duration of a voting trust to 10 years.
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prove to be undesirable to the persons establishing a trust. For example,
some statutes require that a copy of the trust agreement be deposited with
the corporation,17 thus making the terms of the agreement available to all
shareholders; and a few statutes give all shareholders the privilege of coming
into a trust-a privilege which precludes the establishment of a trust limited
to shareholders with the same interests and goals. Furthermore, a voting
trust is somewhat more complicated to set up than is a control arrangement
by shareholders' agreement. The establishment of a voting trust involves
the selection of voting trustees, the transfer of title in the shares to the
trustees, and the issuance of voting trust certificates. Of considerable practical
importance is the fact that the transfer of title to the trustees in some juris-
dictions is subject to state transfer taxes.18
Another grave disadvantage of the voting trust which arises out of the
transfer of title to the shares is that the parties to the agreement may be-
come legal strangers to the corporation and thereby lose some of the rights
and remedies which they had as shareholders. Under the law of some juris-
dictions, it is not clear whether holders of voting trust certificates are en-
titled to inspect corporate books and records, to receive reports, or to bring
shareholders' derivative actions.19
VIII. IRREVOCABLE PROXIES
The parties to a shareholders' agreement, instead of merely binding
themselves to vote their shares as a unit or in accordance with a predeter-
mined plan, sometimes relinquish their power to vote their own shares
and confer that power, in the form of an irrevocable proxy, upon one or
more of their number or upon some person not a party to the agreement.
Even though a shareholders' agreement does not expressly provide for an
irrevocable proxy, such a proxy may be inferred from the content and
purposes of the agreement.20 A proxy may be advantageous in a voting agree-
ment to facilitate implementation of the agreement and to avoid the possibil-
ity that a suit for specific performance, with the attendant uncertainties
and delays, will be necessary to put into effect decisions reached under
the agreement.2'
1l d.
18 See In re Chilson, 19 Del. Ch. 398, 404, 168 A. 82, 84 (Ch. 1933), for an instance
in which the expenses of transferring the shares to the trustees, particularly the cost
of transfer stamps, were found to be prohibitive.
19 See H. BALLANINE, CORPORAMON S 184b (rev. ed. 1946); Ill. Bus. Corp. Act S 45,
ILL. RaV. STAT. ch. 32, S 157.45 (1967), permitting inspection of books and records by
any person holding a voting trust certificate for at least six months prior to demand.2oSee, e.g., Smith v. San Francisco & N.P. Ry., 115 Cal. 584, 47 P. 582 (1897);
but see Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 29 Del. Ch.
610, 53 A.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. 1947), modifying 29 Del. Ch. 318, 49 A.2d 603 (Ch. 1946).
See also 46 MIcH. L. Rav. 70, 76 .(1947). See generally Note, The Irrevocable Proxy
and Voting Control of Small Business Corporations, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 401 (1950).21 See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 29 Del.
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IX. HOLDING COMPANIES
A holding company can be used instead of a shareholders' voting agree-
ment or a voting trust to consolidate the voting power of a group of majority
shareholders. The holders of a majority of the voting shares in company A
can create another corporation, company B, and transfer their shares to
it. Thereafter the shares in company B will be voted as a unit pursuant to
directions from B's board of directors.
In Baum v. Baum Holding Conipany,22 the holders of a majority of the
shares in a realty company assigned their shares to a holding company which
they had formed, and received in exchange an equal number of holding
company shares. Thereafter Baum, the owner of a majority of the holding
company's shares, was able to vote the holding company's shares in the
realty company and exert control over both corporations even though
he was only a minority shareholder in the realty company.
X. MANAGEMENT CoNTTRAcrs
To be distinguished from control agreements among some or all of
the shareholders are agreements executed by the corporation itself under
which its management or the control over certain aspects of its operations
are entrusted to a creditor or to some other individual or corporation. The
contract is usually referred to as a "management agreement" when it at-
tempts to vest the entire management of the corporation or even substantial
management powers in another corporation or individual, particularly when
a substantial fee is to be paid for these management services. A distinction
also should be made between management agreements and the common
arrangements under which the directors temporarily delegate part of their
functions to an executive committee or to corporate officers. An arrangement
delegating authority to an executive committee or some of the corporation's
officers is always subject to the supervision and overriding power of the
directors, and the directors usually can modify or terminate the authority
of a committee or an officer at any time. A management agreement, on the
other hand, does not leave final power in the board.
Judicial opinions dealing with the validity and effect of management
agreements and other corporate contracts which vest control of the cor-
poration in managers other than its duly selected directors and officers
are few in number and in some instances rather unsatisfactory. In particular,
there seems to be a tendency in the decisions to lump together indiscrimi-
Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. 1947), modifying 29 Del. Ch. 318, 49 A.2d 603 (Ch. 1946),
*where the purpose of the voting agreement was frustrated by the failure of the Delaware
Supreme Court to require the recalcitrant party to vote her shares in accordance with
the decision of an arbitrator. The inclusion of irrevocable proxies in a shareholders'
agreement, however, opens the agreement up to considerable risks. For a discussion of
these dangers, see F. O'NEAi, CLOsa CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACtICE S 5.36 (1958).
22 158 Neb. 197, 62 N.W.2d 864 (1954).
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nately cases dealing with corporate contracts and those relating to share-
holders' agreements. The decisions indicate, however, that a management
contract may be subject to attack on two grounds: 23 (1) the contract vio-
lates a statute which provides that the affairs of a corporation shall be
managed by its board of directors;2 4 and (2) the directors of a corporation,
in view of their limited term of office, do not have the capacity to enter
into long-term contracts which would bind future boards for long or
indefinite periods on basic policy or management matters.2 5
Taking the decisions as a whole, the validity of a contract by which
a corporation vests control of its affairs in another person or company
seems to depend upon the number and importance of the powers that are
delegated, the length of time for which the powers are to be held 2 6 and
perhaps the purpose of the contract or the situation out of which it arose.
Management contracts delegating substantially all management powers to
outsiders for indefinite or extended periods of time are usually held invalid.
Thus, a court struck down a contract between two insurance companies
which gave one the "underwriting and executive management" of the other
for a period of 20 years.2 7 From the terms of the agreement and the length
of time it was to remain in effect, the court concluded that "not only man-
agerial powers were delegated, but the entire policy" of one company was
to be fixed and determined by the other.28 Similarly, an agreement by a
corporation giving the purchaser of some of its five-year convertible bonds
23 A management agreement for the control of a public utility or other special
type of corporation may also contravene federal or stare legislation. See, e.g., Investment
Company Act of 1940 § 15, 15 U.S.C. S 80a-15 (1964); Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 79m (1964); Wis. STAT. § 182.0135 (1955).
24Shaw v. Bankers' Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 61 Ind. App. 346, 357-59, 112 N.E. 16, 20
(1916); Marvin v. Solventol Chem. Prods., Inc., 298 Mich. 296, 301-02, 298 N.W. 782,
784 (1941); Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174,
77 N.E.2d 633 (1948).25 See General Paint Corp. v. Kramer, 57 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1932); Beaton v.
Continental Southland Say. & Loan Ass'n, 101 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); 2
W. FLETcHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 495 (perm. ed. rev. 1954); 85 U. PA. L. REV. 849
(1937).
"These directors could not impose an obligation on the corporation or its constantly
changing membership to continue for a long period beyond their term of office and
thus hamper the action of future boards." Clifford v. Firemen's Mut. Benevolent Ass'n,
232 App. Div. 260, 261, 249 N.Y.S. 713, 714 (1931), aff'd mem., 259 N.Y. 547, 182 N.E.
175 (1932).
26 See Sherman & Ellis, Inc. v. Indiana Mut. Cas. Co., 41 F.2d 588, 591 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 282 U.S. 893, 51 S. Ct. 107 (1930).
27 Sherman & Ellis, Inc. v. Indiana Mut. Cas. Co., 41 F.2d 588 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
282 U.S. 893, 51 S. Ct. 107 (1930); accord, Shaw v. Bankers' Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 61 Ind.
App. 346, 357-59, 112 N.E. 16, 20 (1916) (dictum); Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New
Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174, 77 N.E.2d 633 (1948) (corporation and all of
its shareholders were parties to agreement vesting management in one shareholder for
a period of 19 years).
28 Sherman & Ellis, Inc. v. Indiana Mut. Cas. Co., 41 F.2d 588, 591 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 282 U.S. 893, 51 S. Ct. 107 (1930).
[ VOL. 1969
CONTROL DISTRIBUTION DEVICES
the power to designate a comptroller for the corporation and providing
that the comptroller would have complete charge of all finances of the
company and that no expenditures should be made or authorized without his
prior approval, was declared to be against public policy and thus unen-
forceable. 29 On the other hand, corporations have been permitted to delegate
to outsiders, at least for a limited period, some of the functions usually
performed by their directors and officers. For example, an agreement em-
ploying an executive and giving him the position of editor and manager of
a large daily newspaper, with power to determine editorial policy, was held
to be permissible.3 0 And a contract among manufacturing companies estab-
lishing a joint committee with exclusive authority to represent the parties
to the contract in negotiations with employees was sustained against a claim
that it constituted an unlawful delegation of the discretionary functions of
the directors.31
XI. CONCLUSION
The lawyer organizing a close corporation often does not utilize the
considerable freedom that modern corporation statutes give him to shape
the corporate form to the particular business to be served. What the lawyer
has done in the past and what his colleagues are presently doing naturally
color his thinking, and tend to limit what he puts into his documents. Perhaps
this partly explains the uniformity in control arrangements typically used
in close corporations, a "dull sameness" that contrasts sharply with the
uniqueness of the business enterprises served by the control arrangements.
By careful planning and drafting the lawyer often can clarify legal
relationships in areas where the law is uncertain and provide answers to
control problems or difficulties that easily can be anticipated. But even
more important than clearing up legal ambiguities is the thoughtful and
careful tailoring of the control devices to the needs of the particular enter-
prise being organized. The control pattern for a close corporation should
be individually tailored. The ideal control pattern will vary with the nature
and scope of the enterprise, the number of persons who are to participate
in it, the contribution in money, credit, and services that each participant
is to make, the business skills and the personalities of the participants, and
the preferences of the participants.
To achieve a desired control pattern, the control devices discussed in
this article may have to be used in various combinations. Furthermore, the
choice of control devices, even in very similar business situations, may vary
29 Marvin v. Solventol Chem. Prods., Inc., 298 Mich. 296, 298 N.W. 782 (1941).
30 Jones v. Williams, 139 Mo. 1, 40 S.W. 353 (1897) (all of the shareholders and
directors approved the contract; in fact, the dissenting judges viewed it as an agreement
of the individual shareholders rather than as a corporate contract).
a1 Dyers Bros. Golden West Iron Works v. Central Iron Works, 182 Cal. 588, 189
P. 445 (1920).
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from state to state because statutes and judicial decisions affecting the legality
and efficacy of the various devices differ from one jurisdiction to another.
Control arrangements are far more frequently subject to challenge in the
courts than most lawyers realize. Therefore, the lawyer establishing control
arrangements must study the laws of the state in which the corporation is
being organized.
The stability of a control pattern, once established, can sometimes be
affected by the transfer of shares. Thus, careful attention must be given to
restrictions on the transfer of shares, buy-and-sell agreements, and various
types of buy out arrangements. Furthermore, as the security of any control
arrangement increases, thought must be given to provisions for avoiding
dissension, settling disputes, and breaking deadlocks which may develop in
the corporation's management.
One final word of caution is necessary. Preoccupation with achieving
a desired control pattern should not be permitted to result in an inadvertent
loss of other important business, tax, and legal advantages. Inflexible control
arrangements may make it difficult for an enterprise to meet unforeseen
contingencies or to take advantage of unexpected opportunities. Furthermore,
the use of some control devices, such as the classification of shares, pre-
cludes the corporation's election of the favorable tax status authorized by
Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code.32 In other words, the planning
of a close corporation's control pattern and the drafting of documents to
implement those plans should not be isolated from other business and legal
decisions that are made in establishing an enterprise.
32 INT. R~v. CODE of 1954, S§ 1371-77. To be eligible to elect the tax status provided
in subchapter S, a company must be a domestic corporation with one class of stock
and 10 or fewer shareholders. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, S 1371 (a).
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